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INTRODUCTION
In November 2018, The Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Trust
offered a shareholder proposal1 “to adopt a mandatory arbitration
bylaw” in Johnson & Johnson’s annual proxy2 statement.3 Led by
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1
The proposal states, in part:
The shareholders of [Johnson & Johnson] request the Board of Directors take
all practicable steps to adopt a mandatory arbitration bylaw that provides:
for disputes between a stockholder and the Corporation and/or its
directors, officers or controlling persons relating to claims under federal
securities laws in connection with the purchase or sale of any securities
issued by the Corporation to be exclusively and finally settled by
arbitration under the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), as supplemented by the Securities Arbitration
Supplementary Procedures.
Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 19-8828, 2019 WL
1519026, at *1 & n.1 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2019) (quoting the Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable
Trust’s proxy proposal).
2
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Johnson & Johnson’s Motion to
Dismiss at 7, Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr., 2019 WL 1519026 (No. 19-8828)
[hereinafter Brief for Defendant]. A Proxy statement is a required Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) document provided by the corporation to its
shareholders that contains information concerning “voting procedure, nominated
candidates for its board of directors, and compensation of directors and executives.”
Alicia Tuovila, Proxy Statement, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms
/p/proxystatement.asp [https://perma.cc/YH7V-FPR9] (last updated Oct. 30, 2020).
This document is meant to ensure shareholders are up to date with all germane
information heading into an annual or special stockholder meeting. Id.
3
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(g) (2020). A corporation must include a shareholder
proposal in its proxy statement unless the corporation can identify a procedural or
substantive exception. See Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323,
335–36 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8).
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Professor Hal Scott,4 the shareholder’s proposal would ban class
action shareholder disputes and require investors to resolve
federal securities disputes through arbitration.5
Predictably, the Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Trust proxy
proposal set off a flurry of legal actions. Johnson & Johnson first
proposed to exclude the proposal from its proxy materials, and
sought no-action letter to that end from the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”), claiming that, if implemented, the
arbitration bylaw would require the Company to violate state law.6
In February 2019, the staff of the SEC agreed with Johnson &
Johnson and issued the requested no-action letter7 based on New
Jersey state law. The staff’s decision, however, did not end the
matter. The same shareholder filed an action in federal court in
New Jersey8 seeking to enjoin Johnson & Johnson’s April 25
annual meeting because, according to the complaint, the Company
improperly excluded its proposal.9 The New Jersey District Court
denied Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.10 Later, in
June 2021, the district court granted Johnson & Johnson’s motion
to dismiss on mootness and ripeness grounds.11

4
See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss of Proposed Intervenors
California Public Employees’ Retirement System and Colorado Public Employees’
Retirement Ass’n at 5, Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr., 2019 WL 1519026 (No. 198828).
5
See Complaint at 4, Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr., 2019 WL 1519026 (No. 198828).
6
Brief for Defendant, supra note 2, at 8. Johnson & Johnson benefited from an
unsolicited letter from the New Jersey Attorney General stating that the arbitration
bylaw would violate state law. Id. at 1–2.
7
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP, SEC No-Action Letter, 2018 WL
6584469 (Feb. 11, 2019). Subsequently, Johnson & Johnson filed its proxy material
without the Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Trust’s proposal under SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(2),
which permits the exclusion of proposals that would violate either state or federal law.
See Brief for Defendant, supra note 2, at 2.
8
See Complaint, Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr., 2019 WL 1519026 (No. 198828).
9
See Alison Frankel, Shareholder Pushing for Mandatory Arbitration Seeks To
Block J&J’s Annual Meeting, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-otc-j-j/shareholder-pushing-for-mandatory-arbitration-seeks-to-blockjjs-annual-meeting-idUSKCN1R82DD [https://perma.cc/J6UT-TT3X].
10
Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr., 2019 WL 1519026, at *5.
11
Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 19-8828, 2019 WL
2722569, at *3 (D.N.J. June 30, 2021) (finding that The Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable
Trust’s claim is moot because “it seeks a declaration regarding past conduct”); id. at
*4 (“[T]he Court agrees that Plaintiffs’ request is not ripe because any controversy
with respect to a proposal that the Trust might submit in connection with future
shareholder meetings is hypothetical at this juncture and contingent on future
events. . . .”).
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While the Doris Behr Irrevocable Trust’s arbitration proposal
is uncommon, it is not new. For instance, in 2012, shareholders of
Gannett and Pfizer sought to include an arbitration bylaw in each
company’s respective proxy materials, but the SEC permitted both
companies to exclude the proposal12 because, according to the SEC,
it would violate federal law.13 Unlike the Johnson & Johnson
proposal, which narrowly covered “claims under federal securities
laws,”14 the proposal from both the Gannett and Pfizer shareholders used more capacious language to cover “[a]ny controversy
or claim brought directly or derivatively.”15 More recently, the
trustee of CommonWealth REIT adopted a comparably broad
arbitration bylaw, which covered all shareholder disputes.16
The dispute over the Johnson & Johnson arbitration provision
is part of a larger debate over the enforceability of arbitration
bylaws. Starting with CommonWealth REIT, litigation about attempts to add arbitration bylaws has begun to permeate state and
federal courts. In these prior cases, courts found the arbitration
bylaws adopted by the subject corporations enforceable by relying
on recent pro-arbitration United States Supreme Court
decisions.17 Yet these courts devoted little to no analysis to whether state law permitted adopting such bylaws.18 Outside the courtroom, scholars have also debated for years whether corporations
may add mandatory arbitration clauses to bylaws for securities
transactions.19 As with the judicial opinions, the bulk of the
12
See Hogan Lovells US LLP, SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 6859124 (Feb. 22,
2012); Pfizer Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 587597 (Feb. 22, 2012).
13
Opponents of arbitration bylaws have argued that such proposals are
unenforceable under both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act antiwaiver provisions. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77n, 78cc(a) (2018); see also Letter from James
Cox, Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke Univ. Sch. of L., to Mary Jo White, Chair,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 30, 2013) (on file with Duke University). While these
Securities Acts-based claims are relevant to this Note’s subject matter, they are not
discussed.
14
See supra text accompanying note 1.
15
Hogan Lovells US LLP, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 12.
16
See Corvex Mgmt. LP v. CommonWealth REIT, No. 24-C-13-001111, 2013 WL
1915769 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 8, 2013).
17
See, e.g., id.; Katz v. CommonWealth REIT, No. 24-C-13-001299, slip op. at 21–
22, 39–41 (Cir. Ct. Balt. Feb. 19, 2014); see also Delaware Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund v.
Portnoy, No. 13-10405, 2014 WL 1271528, at *16 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014) (denying
plaintiff’s motion for declaratory judgment and permanent injunction on defendant’s
arbitration bylaw).
18
See cases cited supra note 17.
19
See generally Claudia H. Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder
Disputes?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 751 (2015); Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities
Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802; Bradley J.
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analysis, and thus disagreement, amongst these scholars
concerned the application of the Federal Arbitration Act to
corporate governance documents.20
This Note argues that bylaws providing for mandatory
arbitration of federal securities law disputes are unenforceable
under state corporate law. First, to be enforceable, bylaws must,
traditionally, involve the corporation’s internal affairs,21 a choice
of law principle, which in this case limits the control that the corporation can exercise over one of its key constituents—the shareholders. And treating issues concerning federal securities laws as
“internal affairs” is a dubious proposition. Such laws are only
concerned with individual transactions involving purchases or
sales of the corporation’s securities rather than the internal
workings of the transacting corporation. Second, long-standing
court precedent has either explicitly held that securities transactions do not affect a corporation’s internal affairs, or that claims
only tangentially related to the internal workings of a corporation
are not governed by the internal affairs doctrine. Thus, such precedent militates towards the unenforceability of arbitration bylaws
seeking to regulate federal securities transactions.22
Part I discusses why the mechanics of corporate class actions
matter a great deal to corporations, shareholders, and academics.
Part I also details both public and private strategies that opponents of securities class actions have taken to stymie such litigation. Part II examines the competing arguments about whether
Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth Through Reform of
the Securities Class-Action System: Exploring Arbitration as an Alternative to
Litigation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 607 (2010); Zachary D. Clopton & Verity
Winship, A Cooperative Federalism Approach to Shareholder Arbitration, 128 YALE
L.J.F. 169 (2018); Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration
Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583 (2016); Hal S. Scott &
Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory Individual Arbitration for
Stockholder Disputes, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1187 (2013); Paul Weitzel, The End
of Shareholder Litigation? Allowing Shareholders To Customize Enforcement Through
Arbitration Provisions in Charters and Bylaws, 2013 BYU L. REV. 65.
20
See generally, e.g., Allen, supra note 19; Lipton, supra note 19.
21
Cf. Boilermakers Loc. 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 952 (Del.
Ch. 2013) (explaining how bylaws are impermissible under Delaware law if they
regulate matters external to the function of a business, in contrast to bylaws covering
only internal affairs). As explained infra notes 126–152 and accompanying text, the
Delaware Supreme Court has recently broken from this consensus. At the time of this
Note, however, this decision stands as a glaring outlier.
22
While a court would need to address the preemptive effect of the Federal
Arbitration Act, this Note only examines the reach of the internal affairs doctrine. For
a detailed discussion of the Federal Arbitration Act’s applicability to corporate bylaws,
see Lipton, supra note 19.
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federal securities transactions are part of the internal affairs of a
corporation.23
While there has been a shift among corporations to address
litigation threats through private ordering, and the Delaware
Chancery has mainly ratified these different private actions as
consistent with the internal affairs doctrine, courts must eventually draw a line. Otherwise, courts risk the neutering of established
doctrine that the incorporating state’s law governs matters concerning a corporation’s internal affairs. To that end, whether a
claim implicates a corporation’s internal affairs, special attention
must be paid to what relation the parties have to the corporation,
what act gives rise to the cause of action, and what source of law
the claim turns on.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Types of Claims and Size of Dispute

Federal securities class action claims come in several iterations. But some of the most common ones involve either fraud in
a public securities offering under the Securities Act of 193324 or
violations of Rule 10b-525 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 193426 for cases of fraud after the issuance of stock.27
These causes of action allow shareholders to act as a “private
attorney general”—enforcing federal law without relying on the
SEC or Department of Justice to take action first.28
23
Although the Johnson & Johnson litigation illustrates that corporate law can
be challenged in all fifty states, this Note will focus primarily on Delaware law because
of the special place that state holds in the United States for corporate governance. See
Mullen v. Acad. Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 973 n.3 (8th Cir. 1983) (discussing
Delaware law “because of Delaware’s position as a leader in the field of corporate law”
and noting that the “courts of other states commonly look to Delaware law”). These
court decisions, and others like it, are unsurprising as sixty percent of publicly traded
companies are incorporated in Delaware. See Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns,
The Delaware Delusion, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Aug. 3, 2015), https://clsbluesky
.law.columbia.edu/2015/08/03/the-delaware-delusion/ [https://perma.cc/LY4U-9TH4].
24
15 U.S.C. § 77a (2018).
25
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
26
15 U.S.C. § 78a.
27
Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence
from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 497–
98 (2007); Weitzel, supra note 19, at 72.
28
John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 218 (1983); see also
Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 913, 918 & n.17 (citing Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134
F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated, 320 U.S. 707 (1943)).
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Federal securities claims make up a significant proportion of
class actions in federal court. To take one study as an example,
between 2004 and 2005 shareholder securities suits made up fortyeight percent of all class actions pending in federal court.29
In addition, these suits involve a significant amount of potential monetary recovery. For instance, from 2005 to 2010 there
were around 100 securities class actions in each of those years in
federal court that ended in a settlement.30 Of these roughly 100
suits a year, their aggregate settlements ranged from $7 billion to
$17 billion per year.31
Further, while certain parties have called for the elimination
of the practice area writ large,32 these suits have remained prevalent throughout the industry. As of 2018, the securities industry
“saw more companies on [United States] exchanges facing a
greater threat of securities litigation than in any previous year.”33
Even more notable—and surprising considering actions by legislatures and courts to limit securities class action suits34—is that
the 403 newly filed securities class action suits in 2018 “nearly
double[d] the 1997–2017 [filing] average.”35
B.

Opponents

Although securities class action suits have many defenders,36
such suits do not lack critics. For one, these opponents assert that
such suits are an ineffective way to deter future malfeasance or to

29

Weitzel, supra note 19, at 78.
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their
Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 814 (2010).
31
Id.
32
See, e.g., Hal Scott, The SEC’S Misguided Attack on Shareholder Arbitration,
WALL ST. J.: OPINION (Feb. 21, 2019, 7:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-secsmisguided-attack-on-shareholder-arbitration-11550794645 [https://perma.cc/KFM2KZQG].
33
Alexander Aganin & John Gould, Securities Class Action Filings—2018 Year in
Review, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 8, 2019), https://corpgov.law
.harvard.edu/2019/02/08/securities-class-action-filings-2018-year-in-review/ [https://
perma.cc/87ZG-DQDR].
34
See Weitzel, supra note 19, at 80 (discussing the “heighten[ed] pleading requirements, expand[ed] safe harbors, limit[ations] [on] who can sue, cap[ped] damage
amounts, [and] delay[ed] discovery” measures that legislatures have instituted to cut
back on class action securities litigation).
35
Aganin & Gould, supra note 33.
36
See, e.g., Daniel J. Morrissey, Shareholder Litigation After the Meltdown, 114
W. VA. L. REV. 531, 532–33 (2012); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem
in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 336; James D. Cox, Making
Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 499 (1997).
30
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compensate shareholders harmed by fraud because the remedy for
securities class action suits is, they claim, “pocket-shifting wealth
transfers” among shareholders.37 Put differently, when a shareholder class action suit settles, the money the shareholders receive
comes from the company, which ultimately comes from the
shareholders.38 Another critique lodged at shareholder class action suits involves the costs, both in the billions paid to defense
attorneys39 and in “distract[ing] directors” from core business
decisions.40 Finally, opponents of securities class action suits seek
to tar the whole enterprise as a plaintiff attorney money-making
machine.41
Indeed, these opponents have not sat idly by,42 but have deployed several strategies over the years to try to impede federal
securities class actions. First, these individuals turned to the
courts. For instance, in a series of recent decisions, the Supreme
Court has held that liability under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 did not extend to “aiders and abettors”43 and limited liability
for individuals participating in a fraudulent scheme.44
Second, opponents of securities class actions have simultaneously turned to legislatures for redress. And Congress, in particular, has answered that call. Beginning in 1995 with the
passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995

37
John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1583 (2006).
38
This “circularity argument” is one of the most contentious critiques of securities
shareholder class actions, and proponents of such suits vociferously contest the point.
See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, The “Innocent Shareholder”: An Essay on
Compensation and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV.
243, 244–45; Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers
Do Not Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297, 303.
39
See Andrew J. Pincus, What’s Wrong with Securities Class Action Lawsuits? 3
(Feb. 5, 2014) (unpublished report) (on file with the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal
Reform), https://instituteforlegalreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Securities_Class
_Actions_Final1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BDV5-KPCT].
40
Garry D. Hartlieb, Enforceability of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses for
Shareholder-Corporation Disputes, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 131,
131 (2014).
41
See, e.g., In re Trulia, Inc. S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 891–92 (Del. Ch. 2016)
(opining that class action shareholder actions “too often . . . serve[ ] only to generate
fees for certain lawyers”); Scott, supra note 33.
42
See Black, supra note 19, at 803 (“The attacks on the securities fraud class
action never end.”).
43
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 188 (1994).
44
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166–67
(2008).
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(“PSLRA”),45 Congress has capped damages,46 excluded discovery
before determinations on motions to dismiss,47 and restricted
access to state court for federal securities claims.48 However,
because of the mixed results from these efforts,49 the discussion
has turned to new strategies to eliminate such suits. Rather than
relying on courts or Congress, opponents of securities class actions
have now focused their efforts on private ordering.50
C.

New Strategies

Of these private efforts, regulating litigation concerning the
internal workings of a corporation has gained prominence among
opponents of securities class actions. One such strategy practiced
throughout the industry has been adding a forum selection bylaw.51 A bylaw is an “administrative provision adopted by an
organization,” generally a corporation, that controls its internal
governance.52 In Delaware, the authority to adopt, repeal, or
amend bylaws “shall be[long to] the stockholders”; however, stockholders may “confer th[is] power . . . upon the directors.”53 Further, a bylaw may not be “inconsistent with law or with the
certificate of incorporation.”54
In contrast, a forum selection clause concerns litigating
disputes. Specifically, such a clause is a “contractual provision”
designating an agreed-upon location—such as a country, state, or
45

See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737. PSLRA instituted a regime of “heightened pleading requirements, limits on
damages and attorney’s fees, a ‘safe harbor’ for certain kinds of statements,
restrictions on the selection of lead plaintiffs in securities class actions, sanctions for
frivolous litigation, and stays of discovery pending motions to dismiss.” Halliburton
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 277 (2014).
46
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2018).
47
See id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
48
See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
§ 16(b), 112 Stat. 3227, 3228.
49
See Perino, supra note 28, at 915.
50
See Christopher R. Drahozal, Private Ordering and International Commercial
Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2009) (defining private ordering as a
system in which “non-governmental institution[s] . . . regulate the behavior of [their]
members”); see also Omri Yadlin, A Public Choice Approach to Private Ordering: RentSeeking at the World’s First Futures Exchange, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2620, 2620 (2000)
(listing the varying definitions of private ordering).
51
Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, The Brouhaha over Intra-Corporate
Forum Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW.
325, 326 (2012).
52
Bylaw, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
53
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2015).
54
Id. § 109(b).
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type of court—to litigate disputes.55 Advocates of these clauses
assert that multi-jurisdictional litigation causes “[j]udicial resources [to be] wasted” as the “[d]efense counsel is forced to litigate
the same case . . . in multiple courts.”56
Recent decisions from Delaware courts have affirmed the
enforceability of such bylaws regulating the internal workings of
a corporation. First, in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund
v. Chevron Corp.,57 the chancery court upheld board-adopted
forum selection bylaws58 of both Chevron and FedEx.59 In each
case, the board adopted those bylaws without shareholder
approval.60 Then-Chancellor Strine found the challenged bylaws
did affect the “rights” of current shareholders because they
regulated “where stockholders can exercise their right to bring
certain internal affairs claims.”61 The Chancery Court emphasized, however, that a newly promulgated bylaw must “relat[e] to
the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its
rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”62

55

Forum-Selection Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 5022-CC, 2011 WL 1135016,
at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011); see also Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution
of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 333, 335 (2012) (“Forum selection clauses . . . reduce dispute resolution costs, promote efficient contracting, and enhance functional specialization in the judiciary.”).
57
73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
58
Id. at 963. The full bylaw read:
Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an alternative
forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the sole and
exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf
of the Corporation, (ii) any action asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary
duty owed by any director, officer or other employee of the Corporation to the
Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a
claim arising pursuant to any provision of the Delaware General Corporation
Law, or (iv) any action asserting a claim governed by the internal affairs
doctrine. Any person or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any
interest in shares of capital stock of the Corporation shall be deemed to have
notice of and consented to the provisions of this [bylaw].
Id. at 942 (alteration in original).
59
Id. at 937. The court consolidated shareholder challenges to both Chevron’s and
FedEx’s forum selection bylaw because the provisions had the same language. Id. at
938.
60
Id. at 938, 942.
61
Id. at 951; see also Kevin M. LaCroix, Delaware Chancery Court: Forum
Selection Bylaw Valid, D&O DIARY (June 25, 2013), https://www.dandodiary.com
/2013/06/articles/shareholders-derivative-litigation/delaware-chancery-court-forumselection-bylaw-valid/ [https://perma.cc/J92G-W99J].
62
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund, 73 A.3d at 950.
56
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Subsequently, the Delaware legislature codified the Boilermakers holding for forum selection clauses. As amended, section
115 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) states:
The certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require, consistent with applicable jurisdictional requirements, that any or
all internal corporate claims shall be brought solely and exclusively in any or all of the courts in this State, and no provision
of the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may prohibit
bringing such claims in the courts of this State. “Internal corporate claims” means claims, including claims in the right of the
corporation, (i) that are based upon a violation of a duty by a
current or former director or officer or stockholder in such
capacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers jurisdiction upon the
Court of Chancery.63

The new section authorizes forum selection clauses in the
certificate of incorporation or bylaws that stipulate Delaware’s
Chancery Court as the exclusive forum for “internal corporate
claims.”64 Put simply, Delaware corporations may now require all
claims related to the corporation’s internal affairs to be in
Delaware state court. Also of note, the new legislation did not
address federal securities claims.
Similar to Boilermakers, the Delaware Supreme Court, in
ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund,65 faced the enforceability of a unilaterally board-adopted fee-shifting bylaw of a nonstock corporation in cases of unsuccessful intra-corporate litigation.66 Here, too, the Delaware Supreme Court held the bylaw was
enforceable.67 In coming to its conclusion, the court emphasized
63

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (West 2015).
See Jack B. Jacobs, New DGCL Amendments Endorse Forum Selection Clauses
and Prohibit Fee-Shifting, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 17, 2015),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/17/new-dgcl-amendments-endorse-forumselection-clauses-and-prohibit-fee-shifting/ [https://perma.cc/3NBA-D2RW].
65
91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). The case had been certified to the Delaware Supreme
Court by the Delaware Federal District Court. Id. at 555.
66
Id. at 556.
67
Id. at 560. Due to a public outcry in response to the decision, the Delaware
legislature amended current law to prevent fee-shifting bylaws. See tit. 8, § 102(f)
(“The certificate of incorporation may not contain any provision that would impose
liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any
other party in connection with an internal corporate claim, as defined in § 115 of this
title.”); see also DEL. CORP. L. COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF COUNCIL LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSAL 3–4 (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.corporatedefensedisputes.com/wp-content
/uploads/sites/19/2015/03/COUNCIL-SECOND-PROPOSAL-EXPLANATORY-PAPE
R-3-6-15-U0124513.pdf [https://perma.cc/92Y8-JKDL] (fearing that “[f]ee-[s]hifting
[p]rovisions [w]ill [m]ake [s]tockholder [l]itigation, [e]ven if [m]eritorious,
[u]ntenable”).
64
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the fact that fee-shifting only occurred within the context of “intracorporate litigation.”68 In other words, the Court found the bylaw
merely allocated risk among intra-corporate parties, which, to the
court, tracked the mandates of title 8, section 109(b), of the
Delaware Code.69
Although not dealing with federal securities claims, these
recent decisions by Delaware courts have helped clarify the
lengths, and limits, parties can go through for private ordering.
The courts’ holdings in ATP Tour, Inc. and Boilermakers suggest
that boards have near-unfettered discretion when operating
within internal affairs.70 Yet these two decisions also suggest that
the board’s authority does not reach outside that sphere.
Buoyed by the success of expansive bylaws regulating
corporate internal affairs,71 opponents of shareholder class action
claims have trained their eyes on a new frontier: arbitration72
bylaws regulating federal securities claims. To this point, the wisdom, and more importantly the enforceability, of such arbitration
bylaws has been questioned by scholars and the SEC.73 And even
the most ardent supporters of forum selection bylaws have recog-

68
ATP Tour, Inc., 91 A.3d at 557. Later, in Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, the Delaware
Supreme Court drew a distinction between intra-corporate and internal-affairs
claims. 227 A.3d 102, 130–31 (Del. 2020). Although not the focus of this paper, this
decision is briefly discussed infra notes 126–152 and accompanying text.
69
ATP Tour, Inc., 91 A.3d. at 558.
70
In the four months immediately following the Boilermakers decision, 112
Delaware Corporations adopted or announced plans to adopt exclusive forum bylaws.
See Claudia H. Allen, United States: Trends in Exclusive Forum Bylaws, MONDAQ
(Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/287660/Shareholders/Trends
+In+Exclusive+Forum+Bylaws [https://perma.cc/9JJH-R4LG].
71
See id.; see also, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73
A.3d 934, 963 (Del. Ch. 2013); City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc.,
99 A.3d 229, 230, 242 (Del. Ch. 2014) (upholding a bylaw selecting the federal Eastern
District of North Carolina as the designated forum). But see Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F.
Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that a forum selection bylaw unilaterally
adopted by corporate directors is unenforceable).
72
An arbitration clause is an agreement between contracting parties to settle
disagreements through a “dispute-resolution process” overseen by “one or more
neutral third parties.” Arbitration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also
Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 760 (2004) (describing arbitration as a
“dispute-resolution process”).
73
See supra note 19 and accompanying text; Hogan Lovells US LLP, SEC NoAction Letter, supra note 12; Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Delaware Law Status of
Bylaws Regulating Litigation of Federal Securities Law Claims, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 29, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/29
/delaware-law-status-of-bylaws-regulating-litigation-of-federal-securities-law-claims
[https://perma.cc/76FP-853R].
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nized arbitration bylaws raise different enforceability questions.74
Nonetheless, parties have proceeded with arbitration bylaw proposals, such as the Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Trust and the
trustee of Commonwealth REIT.75 Others have backed off proposals after opposition from the SEC, like the proposals from both
Gannett and Pfizer76 and one by the Carlyle Group L.P. in 2012.77
While much of the scholarship in this area has focused on the
preemptive effect of the Federal Arbitration Act,78 not enough
attention has been paid to whether such bylaws are allowed in the
first place under state-corporate law. Even those articles that
have made a corporation’s internal affairs the central theme have
only briefly discussed the doctrine’s applicability to arbitration
clauses.79
Yet, even absent exhaustive scholarship, the uncertainty
demonstrated by scholars and the SEC about enforceability of
arbitration bylaws is unsurprising as such clauses raise serious
state law concerns. In particular, such arbitration bylaws clash
with traditional notions of corporate internal affairs.
II. THE LIMITATIONS ON PRIVATE ORDERING
IMPOSED BY THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
Arbitration bylaws seeking to cover disputes involving federal
securities transactions do not satisfy the requirements of the
internal affairs doctrine. First, federal securities claims are
unconcerned with the relationship between the corporation,
directors, and stockholders. Indeed, many securities transactions
occur between a corporation and a then-third party. Thus, such
transactions do not implicate the internal affairs of a
corporation. Moreover, long-standing precedent by legislatures

74
See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limits of Delaware Corporate Law: Internal
Affairs, Federal Forum Provisions, and Sciabacucchi, 75 BUS. LAW. 1319, 1331 (2020).
75
See supra Introduction.
76
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
77
“[T]he SEC effectively blocked the IPO” of the Carlyle Group L.P. after the
company had intended to include an arbitration clause for federal securities claims in
its originating documents. Andrew Rhys Davies, Should the SEC Allow IPOs When
Bylaws Require Arbitration of Federal Securities Claims?, N.Y. L.J. (July 26, 2018,
2:30 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/07/26/should-the-sec-allowipos-when-bylaws-require-arbitration-of-federal-securities-claims/ [https://perma.cc
/NT66-FFL2].
78
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
79
See generally, e.g., Mohsen Manesh, The Contested Edges of Internal Affairs, 87
TENN. L. REV. 251, 295–96 (2020).
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and courts has sought to bifurcate claims over a corporation’s
internal affairs and the federal securities laws.
A.

The Doctrine

Recent decisions by Delaware courts on the reach of corporations’ governance documents rest on the internal affairs doctrine.
The internal affairs doctrine revolves around internal corporate
governance, usually expressed through documents such as bylaws
and charters.80 Specifically, the doctrine is a choice of law principle.81 This distinction between internal and external affairs
comes from corporate governance being within the province of
state law in the United States.82 To remedy any confusion that
may stem from potentially fifty sets of corporate law, the internal
affairs doctrine ensures “that only one State should have the
authority to regulate a corporation’s . . . affairs” for the corporation to avoid “conflicting demands.”83 Thus, the state law in which
incorporation occurred controls over disputes arising from the
corporation’s internal affairs.84 While most states have codified

80
See Henry DuPont Ridgely, The Emerging Role of Bylaws in Corporate
Governance, 68 SMU L. REV. 317, 318–19 (2015); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *475–76 (“[B]y-laws or private statutes [are] for the better government of
the corporation . . . .”).
81
See Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal
Affairs Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 29, 44 (1987); Frederick Tung,
Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33, 39
(2006) (“In its modern form, the internal affairs doctrine is a choice of law rule, widely
accepted among states . . . .”); VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc.,
871 A.2d 1108, 1112 (Del. 2005) (“The internal affairs doctrine is a long-standing
choice of law principle which recognizes that only one state should have the authority
to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—the state of incorporation.”).
82
See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (describing
corporate governance litigation as involving “private parties hav[ing] entered legal
relationships with the expectation that their rights and obligations would be governed
by state-law standards”); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977)
(“Corporations are creatures of state law . . . .” (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84
(1975))).
83
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982); see also Manesh, supra note 79,
at 263−64.
84
Lynn M. LoPucki, Corporate Charter Competition, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2101,
2110 (2018).
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the internal affairs doctrine,85 some scholars and judges believe
that the doctrine is a constitutional command.86
To abide by this choice of law principle, a corporation’s bylaws
must relate to “the business of the corporation[ ], the conduct of
[its] affairs, or the rights of the stockholders.”87 Further, valid
bylaws must be “procedural [and] process-oriented [in] nature”88
in that they “direct how the corporation, the board, and its stockholders may take certain actions.”89 Put differently, the internal
affairs doctrine distinguishes between actions by an individual or
a corporation and actions “peculiar to the corporate entity.”90
As a general matter, the exact reach of the doctrine remains
an open question.91 While courts—especially Delaware courts—
have taken an expansive view of the internal affairs doctrine,92
these outcomes have done little to establish the exact contours of
the doctrine. In fact, courts within the same state will often have
conflicting holdings on the same issue concerning the reach of the

85
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (West 2015) (“The bylaws may contain
any provision . . . relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs,
and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers
or employees.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 15.01(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“The law of
the jurisdiction of formation of a foreign corporation governs . . . the internal affairs
of the foreign corporation . . . .”).
86
Buxbaum, supra note 81, at 44 (claiming the internal affairs doctrine is rooted
in the Fair Faith and Credit Clause); McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 217 (Del.
1987) (“[W]e conclude that application of the internal affairs doctrine is mandated by
constitutional principles . . . .”). But see Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara,
Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661, 716 (“[T]he [internal
affairs doctrine] never has been entitled to constitutional protection . . . .”).
87
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 951 (Del. Ch.
2013); see also Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645–46.
88
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund, 73 A.3d at 951 (quoting CA, Inc. v. AFSCME
Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 235 (Del. 2008)).
89
Id.
90
McDermott Inc., 531 A.2d at 214; accord Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102,
128 (Del. 2020).
91
See Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Centros, California’s “Women on
Boards” Statute and the Scope of Regulatory Competition 8 (Eur. Corp. Governance
Inst., Law Working Paper No. 454/2019, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=3384768 (“[T]he scope of the internal affairs doctrine . . . remain[s]
somewhat unclear.”).
92
See Manesh supra note 79, at 269; see also VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996
v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 2005) (“[T]he conflicts practice of both state
and federal courts has consistently been to apply the law of the state of incorporation
to ‘the entire gamut of internal corporate affairs.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting
McDermott Inc., 531 A.2d at 216)). This capacious reading of the internal affairs
doctrine by Delaware courts should come as no surprise because, considering that the
majority of corporations incorporate in Delaware, such rulings enlarge the power of
its state courts. See Manesh supra note 79, at 269.
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internal affairs doctrine.93 Given this uncertainty, the recent decisions from Delaware Courts94 help clarify the doctrine.
B.

Internal Affairs and Federal Securities Transactions

Past practices of legislatures and courts of separating internal
corporate matters and federal securities laws clash with the legal
scheme envisioned by advocates of arbitration bylaws. In fact, the
bifurcation of securities transactions and corporate internal affairs dates back to some of the oldest cases in this field.95 Congress
has also supported the division of federal and state law concerning
corporations. Recognizing the long-standing principle of avoiding
the overlap between federal securities law and state corporate law,
Congress added a “savings clause”—known as the “Delaware
carve-out”96—to the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998 (“SLUSA”)97 to “preserve[ ] certain types of state-law
claims that would otherwise be subject to its preclusion provision.”98 To that end, SLUSA’s legislative history buttresses the
claim that Congress was concerned with avoiding overlap.99
93
Compare Miesse v. Seiberling Rubber Co., 264 A.D. 373, 374 (1st Dep’t 1942)
(finding a dispute over redeeming preferred stock under the corporation’s internal
affairs), with Borst v. E. Coast Shipyards, 105 N.Y.S.2d 228, 231–32 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Cnty. 1951) (holding the plaintiff’s claim to redeem preferred stock was not a matter
under the internal affairs doctrine).
94
See supra notes 57–71 and accompanying text.
95
See, e.g., Williams v. Gaylord, 186 U.S. 157, 165 (1902) (“[W]hen a corporation
sells or encumbers its property, incurs debts or gives securities, it does business, and
a statute regulating such transactions does not regulate the internal affairs of the
corporation.”).
96
Kenneth Hsu, The Delaware Carve-Out’s Carve: Examining and Repairing
SLUSA’s State Law Exception, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 385, 387 (2015).
97
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227. Congress has also sought to create corporate carve outs in other areas of
the law. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(C) (2018) (exempting certain internal affairs
claims from the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005).
98
Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Malone v.
Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 13 (Del. 1998) (“The 1998 Act, however, contains two important
exceptions . . . . These exceptions have become known as the ‘Delaware carve-outs.’ ”).
99
The Senate Committee Report on SLUSA states, in part:
The Committee is keenly aware of the importance of state corporate law,
specifically those states that have laws that establish a fiduciary duty of
disclosure. It is not the intent of the Committee in adopting this legislation
to interfere with state law regarding the duties and performance of an
issuer’s directors or officers in connection with a purchase or sale of
securities by the issuer or an affiliate from current shareholders or
communicating with existing shareholders with respect to voting their
shares, acting in response to a tender or exchange offer, or exercising
dissenters’ or appraisal rights.
S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 6 (1998).
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Courts, too, have been wary of allowing the legal scheme
advanced by arbitration bylaw advocates. In particular, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected attempts to “federalize”100
causes of action dealing with a corporation’s internal workings.
For instance, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, the Court
refused to adopt a “ ‘federal fiduciary principle’ under Rule
10b-5.”101 In coming to its holding, the Court relied on congressional intent in enacting the Securities Exchange Act, which “did
not seek to regulate transactions which constitute[d] . . . internal
corporate mismanagement.”102 Instead, the 1934 Act sought to
regulate transactions between outside third parties.103
Yet more problematic for advocates of arbitration bylaws is
the Supreme Court’s holding in Edgar v. MITE Corp., which
struck down the Illinois Business Take-Over Act as an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.104 The Illinois Act, applying
to issuers of securities “of which shareholders located in Illinois
own 10%,” regulated tender offers.105
In rejecting the argument that the Illinois statute regulated
internal affairs, Justice White, writing for the Court, defined
tender offers as “transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party
[that] do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target
company.”106 Under this definition, the court found that tender
offers involve a then-third party and that they thus have no
bearing on the internal rights of the transacting corporation.107
100
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (“Absent a clear
indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial
portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities,
particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be
overridden.”); see also Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 412–13 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(finding the newly promulgated SEC rule requiring corporations to abide by one
share/one vote principles to be a federal intrusion into a “major issue[ ] traditionally
governed by state law”).
101
Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 479.
102
Id. (quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971)).
103
Superintendent of Ins., 404 U.S. at 12.
104
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982).
105
Id. at 627.
106
Id. at 645.
107
Id. As with securities transactions generally, the buyer—in this case the
tender offeror—may already own other shares of the company, but that is irrelevant
to the role it occupies as to the transaction at issue. Federal Securities laws apply
equally to current-shareholders and non-shareholders alike. Further, these laws are
only concerned with the effect of potential violations of its provisions on an investor
acting in that role as to that particular transaction. Any other relationship to the
company, as to the transaction, is irrelevant.
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With this precedential background from the Supreme Court,
and recent holdings from Delaware Courts, it is hard to imagine a
scenario where arbitration bylaws seeking to cover federal
securities transactions would fall within the internal affairs of a
corporation. If tender offers do not regulate a corporation’s internal affairs, how do standard market transactions affect internal
affairs?
To that end, as the Chancery Court stated in
Sciabacucchi, “the purchaser is not yet a stockholder and does not
yet have any relationship with the corporation that is governed by
Delaware corporate law.”108 While the purchaser of stock will
eventually become associated with the interplay of the rights and
powers between the corporation, directors, and stockholders, at
the time of purchase he or she is an outside third party. No
amount of clever argumentation can explain away the inclusion of
a then-third party under a doctrine that only touches matters
“peculiar to [the] corporation[ ].”109
What is more, federal securities claims implicate different
rights than those under a corporation’s internal affairs.110
A corporation is brought into existence by the state as a sovereign
power, which governs the corporation through the state’s operative
law.111 Through this process, state law reigns over the internal
determinations of the corporation.112 By contrast, federal securities transactions derive from federal law meant to regulate the
purchase and sale of securities. A securities claim thus implicates
a violation of federal law at most incidental to the internal
workings of a corporation. Simply put, the state-based rights of
the internal affairs doctrine are unconcerned whether parties
follow federal law.
Indeed, federal securities transactions conflict with the longheld understanding by Delaware Courts of a corporation’s internal
affairs. Federal securities transactions do not “pertain to the relationships among or between the corporation and its officers,
108
Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931, 2018 WL 6719718, at *17 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 19, 2018), rev’d, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020).
109
QVT Fund LP v. Eurohypo Cap. Funding LLC I, No. 5881, 2011 WL 2672092,
at *7 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2011) (quoting McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 215 (Del.
1987)).
110
See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 79, 80 (2005) (“The federal securities laws generally have been considered
full disclosure statutes, as opposed to merit regulation statutes or laws governing the
internal affairs of corporations.”).
111
See Sciabacucchi, 2018 WL 6719718, at *18.
112
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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directors, and shareholders.”113 As securities transactions occur by
an outside, third party, the transaction is not “among or between”
the internal affair’s stakeholders.114 While engaging in securities
transactions are acts corporations participate in, courts must
exclude from the internal affairs doctrine “acts which can be
performed by both corporations and individuals.”115 That is why
the internal affairs doctrine “does not extend to claims ‘where the
rights of third parties external to the corporation are at issue.’ ”116
Other claims that do fall within a corporation’s internal
affairs are illustrative of the disconnect between such a claim and
federal securities transactions. For instance, the internal affairs
doctrine implicates disputes over whether a contract binds a
corporation created in a “spin-off transaction” that the former
parent company engaged in with its former stockholder.117 Putting
aside the more esoteric contract questions, the issue for the
stockholders involved the internal affairs doctrine because the
relevant terms of the agreement pertained to the rights of
stockholders with the corporation. Unlike the position of the buyer
in many securities transactions, the plaintiffs here were stockholders at the time the deal was struck. Nor is a dispute over a
contractual “put right”118 clause, that gave the plaintiff the authority to dissolve the company, outside the reach of the internal
affairs doctrine.119 Dissimilar to a federal securities claim, which
stems from federal law, the ability to dissolve a company directly

113
VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113
(Del. 2005).
114
See Citigroup Inc. v. AHW Inv. P’ship, 140 A.3d 1125, 1140 (Del. 2016) (holding
that a defendant’s misstatement about a stock trade resulted in a “personal” claim
that was not “governed by the internal affairs doctrine”); see also In re Ebix, Inc.
S’holder Litig., No. 8526-VCN, 2014 WL 3696655, at *17 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2014)
(explaining that “this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction” over
“issue[s] . . . governed by the federal securities laws”).
115
McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 214 (Del. 1987).
116
Stewart v. Wilmington Tr. SP Servs., Inc., 112 A.3d 271, 291 (Del. Ch.) (quoting
VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996, 871 A.2d at 1113 n.14), aff’d, 126 A.3d 1115
(Del. 2015).
117
See Miramar Police Officers’ Ret. Plan v. Murdoch, No. 9860, 2015 WL
1593745, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 7, 2015).
118
JOHN B. LYNCH, JR. & TAYLOR A. SHEA, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ORGANIZING A
BUSINESS IN CONNECTICUT § 7.8.2 (“A put right gives a stakeholder the right to force
the company and/or other stakeholders (in proportion to their ownership interests) to
purchase from it all of its interest in the company under certain specified
circumstances.”).
119
See Terramar Retail Ctrs., LLC v. Marion #2-Seaport Tr., No. 12875, 2017 WL
3575712, at *1–3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2017), aff’d, 184 A.3d 1290 (Del. 2018).
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implicates the rights derived from one’s legal relationship with the
company.
Proponents of a broad reading of the internal affairs doctrine
proffer that securities laws are “clearly internal” because of the
internal nature of board decisions that give rise to the securities
claim.120 But such a view misreads the internal affairs doctrine—
especially after Boilermakers and ATP Tour, Inc.—and would lead
to confusing results. Indeed, such an everything-between-theshareholders-and-company-is-internal-affairs approach has no
logical end. What happens if a director, furious at a stockholder
over a recent proxy vote, assaulted the stockholder on the
company’s premises? This example involves the directors, company, and stockholders but does not fall within the internal affairs
doctrine.
But more problematic for this reading of the internal affairs
doctrine is that myriad claims once excluded from a corporation’s
internal affairs would now find such a home. For instance, creditors of an insolvent corporation, seeking to bring the suit under
Delaware law, could now justifiably make such a claim.121
Likewise, claims against aiders and abettors of a director’s breach
of fiduciary duty in a merger could be under the corporation’s
internal affairs.122 In fact, the latter example parallels federal
securities claims because both involve the purchase of a
corporation’s shares. Put succinctly, these claims are not predicated on the relationship between stockholders, directors, and the
corporation, as required by the internal affairs doctrine,123 but
rather on relationships of outsiders to these three stakeholders.
It is against this traditional legal backdrop, with the requirement that a corporation’s bylaws or charter provisions involve
issues that touch upon a relationship peculiar to the stockholders,
directors, and the corporation, in which most state laws are
passed.124 Indeed, the Delaware legislature recently codified the
120

See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 74, at 1364.
Cf. Askanase v. Fatjo, 130 F.3d 657, 670–71 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding claims by
a trustee of an insolvent corporation against creditors for improper transfer of
corporate funds were not a matter under the corporation’s internal affairs so Texas
law, rather than Delaware law, governed).
122
Cf. Dominion Energy, Inc. v. City of Warren Police & Fire Ret. Sys., 928 F.3d
325, 337 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding claims by former shareholders of a merged
corporation against the directors of the acquirer corporation for aiding and abetting a
breach of fiduciary duty were outside the corporation’s internal affairs).
123
See supra notes 80–109 and accompanying text.
124
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-2,207(c) (West 2017) (“The Nebraska
Model Business Corporation Act does not authorize this state to regulate the
121
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Boilermakers’s decision, thus solidifying the rule that corporations
may not enact forum selection clauses that govern external
claims.125 It was for these reasons that the Delaware Supreme
Court’s holding in Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, overturning the
Chancery Court,126 was so puzzling.
The Delaware Chancery had invalidated forum selection
clauses in three companies’ initial public offerings127 that required
claims under the Securities Act of 1933 to be filed in federal
court.128 In reversing the Chancery’s decision, the Delaware Supreme Court held that, while not within a corporation’s internal
affairs,129 federal securities laws are within “intra-corporate”
affairs.130 This term, explained the court, described an area in

organization or internal affairs of a foreign corporation authorized to transact
business in this state.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-604 cmt. 2 (West 2012) (“This Act’s
applicability to UNAs formed in other jurisdictions that are operating in this state is
necessary because in all other types of entities the internal affairs rules of the
jurisdiction of the entity’s formation (e.g., the governance rules and duties and
responsibilities of the owners and managers to each other and the entity)
control . . . .”).
125
See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
126
227 A.3d 102, 109 (Del. 2020).
127
The three companies were Blue Apron, Stitch Fix, and Roku. See Kevin M.
LaCroix, Delaware Court Holds Charter Provision Designating a Federal Forum for
Section 11 Claims Is Invalid, D&O DIARY (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.dandodiary
.com/2018/12/articles/securities-litigation/delaware-court-holds-charter-provisiondesignating-federal-forum-section-11-claims-invalid/ [https://perma.cc/WE4B-MC7T].
Roku’s and Stitch Fix’s forum selection provision reads:
Unless the Company consents in writing to the selection of an alternative
forum, the federal district courts of the United States of America shall be the
exclusive forum for the resolution of any complaint asserting a cause of
action arising under the Securities Act of 1933. Any person or entity
purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in any security of the
Corporation shall be deemed to have notice of and consented to [this
provision].
Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931, 2018 WL 6719718, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19,
2018) (alteration in the original), rev’d, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020).
128
Sciabacucchi, 2018 WL 6719718, at *1.
129
Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 123 (“[N]ot even Appellants are contending that Section
11 claims are ‘internal affairs’ claims . . . .”).
130
Id. at 125.
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between a corporation’s internal and external affairs.131 And title
8, section 102(b)(1), of the Delaware Code, which does not mention
internal affairs, authorized purportedly intra-corporate actions.132
This dichotomy between internal and intra-corporate affairs
is novel, however.133 Oddly enough, in the court’s attempt to define
“intra-corporate affairs,” it cited cases that used “intracorporate”
and “internal” disputes interchangeably as well as scholarly work
on the definition of the internal affairs doctrine.134 Nevertheless,
the Delaware Supreme Court, in essence, adopted the position
offered by the petitioner at oral argument: “If the legislatures
wanted to say internal affairs, they knew how to say it.”135
131

To illustrate the point, the court created a Venn diagram:

Id. at 131 fig.1.
132
Id. at 131. Of note for this paper, the Delaware Supreme Court found that
Delaware law forbids corporations from including mandatory arbitration provisions
in their certificate of incorporation or bylaws under the plain language of title 8,
section 115, of the Delaware Code. Id. at 137 n.169.
133
While addressing the topics briefly, this paper does not take a deep dive into
Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi or this new intra-corporate affairs theory.
134
See, e.g., Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 128 (quoting McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d
206, 216 (Del. 1987) (internal citation omitted)); id. at 125 n.99 (citing Manesh, supra
note 79, at 297–98); see also Ann Lipton, So the Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi Decision Is
In!, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Mar. 21, 2020), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business
_law/2020/03/so-the-salzberg-v-sciabacucchi-decision-is-in.html [https://perma.cc/H5FRWHKS] (making the same point).
135
Oral Argument at 11:45, Salzberg, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020) (No. 346,2019),
https://livestream.com/accounts/5969852/events/8952021/videos/200564724/player.
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Yet this argument turns accepted principles of statutory
interpretation on their head. While the Delaware Supreme Court
claimed its only job was to “construe the plain language of the
statute,”136 no other federal or state court has adopted the position
that laws are passed “upon a clean slate.”137 Instead, legislatures
are understood to pass laws “against a background” of “commonlaw principle[s],”138 which informs the statutory language. For instance, courts have held that congress writes bankruptcy laws in
the context of the “pre-Code rule[s],”139 that the Federal Rules of
Evidence are drafted with the “prevailing common-law rule[s]” in
mind,140 and that criminal laws are passed against the backdrop of
“the deep-rooted nature of law-enforcement discretion . . . .”141
Under this framework, accepted by numerous different fields
of law, the Delaware legislature would be expected to make a clear
statement if it wished not to be bound by the internal affairs
doctrine.142 Otherwise, it should be presumed that the legislature
was acting within the “hundred years”143 old guidelines of this
doctrine.144 In fact, then-Chancellor Strine’s opinion in Boiler136

Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 125.
Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 435 (1998) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
138
Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991); accord
Mountain Peaks Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Roth-Steffen, 778 N.W.2d 380, 384 (Minn. Ct. App.
2010); Scott v. Mattingly, 488 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Neb. 1992); cf. Note, The Internal
Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications and Tentative Explanations for Its
Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480, 1482 (2002) (describing the internal
affairs doctrine as “customary common law”); Oral Argument at 21:27, Salzberg, 227
A.3d 102 (Del. 2020) (No. 346,2019), https://livestream.com/accounts/5969852/events
/8952021/videos/200564724/player (acknowledging that the internal affairs doctrine
is “a part of [Delaware’s] common law”).
139
E.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992).
140
E.g., Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 156 (1995).
141
E.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2005) (Scalia, J.).
Justice Scalia’s opinion is noteworthy because even he, a leader in the move to
enshrine “textualism” as the primary statutory-interpretive tool of the judiciary, see
Paul Clement, Arguing Before Justice Scalia, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/opinion/arguing-before-justice-scalia.html [https://
perma.cc/EHZ6-VPFD], never claimed that the text of the statute was the only
acceptable consideration for the court.
142
Cf. Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 125 (Del. 2020) (“If our General Assembly wishes to
narrow the scope of Section 102(b)(1) to be aligned perfectly with the boundaries of
the internal affairs doctrine, it could do so.”).
143
Oral Argument at 21:17, Salzberg, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020) (No. 346,2019),
https://livestream.com/accounts/5969852/events/8952021/videos/200564724/player.
144
Cf. Hamilton v. United Laundries Corp., 111 N.J. Eq. 78, 80 (N.J. Ch. 1932)
(explaining that it “is almost too obvious for remark that [the state of New Jersey]
cannot regulate the internal affairs of foreign corporations” (quoting Gregory v. N.Y.,
Lake Erie & W. R.R. Co., 40 N.J. Eq. 38, 44 (N.J. Ch. 1885))). The Delaware Supreme
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makers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp.145 appeared
to proceed under this framework. This is because although Delaware’s statute for bylaws, title 8, section 109(b), of the Delaware
Code, did not explicitly mention a corporation’s internal affairs,146
the opinion still explained how bylaws regulating “external matters” would be unenforceable.147
At bottom, the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision has created
“uncertain challenges”148 for corporate law moving forward.
Is there, for instance, a different analysis for Section 11 claims and
those under 10b-5?149 And how will Salzberg impact decisions by
other states’ highest courts on the limits of their corporate law,150
as other states “often look[ ] to Delaware’s rich abundance of corporate law for guidance”?151 Based on the preceding sections, these
state courts should try to stay in their “lane[s]” by maintaining the
traditional limits on corporate authority that were universally

Court made much of the fact that the Delaware legislature explicitly mentions
“internal affairs” in other statutes, see Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 117–19, but it is unclear
why that changed the analysis. There is no support for the proposition that a
legislature explicitly mentioning a common-law principle in the text of a statute
vitiates for the remaining laws within the jurisdiction the accepted statutory
interpretive rule that laws are passed against the backdrop of common-law principles.
145
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 952 (Del. Ch.
2013).
146
It instead constrained a corporation’s bylaws to “the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and . . . the rights or powers of its stockholders,
directors, officers or employees.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8 § 109(b) (West 2015)); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(1) (West 2018) (“Any
provision for the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the
corporation, and . . . regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the
stockholders, or any class of the stockholders, or the governing body, members, or any
class or group of members of a nonstock corporation . . . .”).
147
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund, 73 A.3d at 952.
148
Jeff Montgomery, Del. Federal Forum Ruling Could Open Door to Mischief,
LAW360 (Mar. 19, 2020, 11:38 PM), https://www.law360.com/securities/articles
/1255189/del-federal-forum-ruling-could-open-door-to-mischief [https://perma.cc/JSX9RMJA] (quoting Professor Lawrence A. Hamermesh); see Lipton, supra note 134.
149
See Lipton, supra note 134; cf. Seafarers Pension Plan ex rel. Boeing Co. v.
Bradway, No. 19 C 8095, 2020 WL 3246326, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 2020) (opining that
Salzberg’s analysis is not controlling in cases concerning the enforceability of forum
selection clauses regulating claims under the “1934 Act”).
150
See generally, e.g., Ann Lipton, The United States of Delaware, BUS. L. PROF
BLOG (Aug. 15, 2020), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2020/08/theunited-states-of-delaware.html [https://perma.cc/YN8W-4SAH] (discussing the conflicting Delaware and California law concerning shareholder inspection rights).
151
IBS Fin. Corp. v. Seidman & Assocs., 136 F.3d 940, 949–50 (3d Cir. 1998).
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accepted before Salzberg.152 This approach has allowed for the law
to grow against a predictable legal landscape.
CONCLUSION
Arbitration bylaws regulating federal securities claims are
unenforceable. A corporation’s internal affairs do not include
securities claims because such claims do not turn on the rights
between the corporation, directors, and current stockholders.
Considering the purpose of securities shareholder suits—
mainly holding directors accountable—this is a just result. It
would make little sense, given this national purpose, to shuttle
federal securities claims off to arbitration forums. Such a scheme
will lead to the deterioration of a developing national standard
protecting against fraudulent securities conduct.

152
Myron T. Steele, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Delaware Perspective, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 503, 506–07 (2008).

